The phylogenetic position of the hagfish remains enigmatic. In contrast to molecular data that suggest monophyly of the cyclostomes, several morphological features imply a more ancestral state of this animal compared with the lampreys. To resolve this question requires an understanding of the embryology of the hagfish, especially of the neural crest. The early development of the hagfish has long remained a mystery. We collected a shallow‐water‐dwelling hagfish, Eptatretus burgeri, set up an aquarium tank designed to resemble its habitat, and (...) successfully obtained several embryos. By observing the histology and expression of genes known to play fundamental roles in the neural crest, we found that the hagfish crest develops as delaminating migratory cells, as in other vertebrates. We conclude that the delaminating neural crest is a vertebrate synapomorphy that seems to have appeared from the beginning of their evolutionary history, before the splitting away of the hagfish lineage. BioEssays 30:167–172, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Feinberg and Mallatt, in their presentation of neurobiological naturalism, have suggested that visual consciousness was acquired by early vertebrates and inherited by a wide range of descendants, and that its neural basis has shifted to nonhomologous nervous structures during evolution. However, their evolutionary scenario of visual consciousness relies on the assumption that visual consciousness is closely linked with survival, which is not commonly accepted in current consciousness research. We suggest an alternative idea that visual consciousness is linked to a specific (...) class of agency, consequently justifying their phylogenetic claim. We also examine the implication of their phylogenetic claim: visual consciousness is homologous across vertebrates, but its neural basis is not. This apparent incongruence illustrates a general phenomenon of homology, and that the resulting hierarchical view of visual consciousness and its neural basis can be straightforwardly accommodated by neurobiological naturalism. Throughout these discussions, we aim to address the potential theoretical issues in neurobiological naturalism and refine the picture illustrated by Feinberg and Mallatt regarding phylogenetic distribution and trajectories of visual consciousness. (shrink)

Criticizes traditional deontic logic and argues in favor of a genuine logic of norms. Gives a structure analysis of the so- called practical inference and of nomic causal propositions, and provides a critical account of von Wright's practical philosophy. The work also offers critical analyses of discourse rationality and of Wittgensteien's views on philosophizing, and includes an homage to von Wright. Of interest to readers in philosophical logic, practical philosophy, sociology of institutions, legal philosophy, and theory democracy. Annotation copyrighted by (...) Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)

Georges Kalinowski und G. H. von Wright haben die Epoche der deontischen Logik eingeleitet. Heute geht es darum, eine neue Basis für eine echte Normenlogik zu schaffen. Ausgangspunkt ist die informationstheoretisch fundierte Handlungstheorie.

This volume contains papers in which Hans Kelsen addresses a number of philosophical issues that are crucial to his defense of the pure theory of law. Although it includes some papers appearing in English for the first time, this collection differs little in scope or substance from an earlier one, What is Justice? Kelsen’s legal theory has raised the ire of critics because they believe it separates far too sharply law from ethics. In these papers, especially those written in recent (...) years, Kelsen contends that the separation he proposes does not eliminate the possibility of criticizing the law on moral grounds; but, since there is often no agreement on moral beliefs or any means of establishing their correctness, it is often necessary to support or validate a legal system on a nonmoral basis. Thus, many of these papers deal with Kelsen’s concept of a norm and the means by which the basic norm, the one which validates all others, can be validated. Kelsen’s much criticized contention that the basic norm can be validated by a principle of minimum effectiveness is stated in a number of papers; these various statements may help to clarify the nature of the validation that he believes to be sufficient. Moral philosophers, who have generally ignored Kelsen’s work, will discover that he has much to say on moral relativism and natural law. Kelsen’s belief in the relativity of moral value, a belief he held to be quite different from the denial of any values, is used to support both his rejection of natural law and his contention that a valid legal order need not be in accord with any particular moral order. Along with papers dealing with the validation of norms and moral relativism, there are papers dealing with causality and accountability, God and the State, and the principle of retribution. There is a brief, helpful introduction by Ota Weinberger.—M.G. (shrink)

This paper argues that McDowell wrongly assumes that “terror”, Cavell’s reaction to the radical contingency of our shared modes of knowing or our “attunement”, expresses a skepticism that is antinomically bound to an equally unacceptable dogmatism because Cavell rather regards terror as a mood that reveals the “truth of skepticism”, namely, that there is no conclusive evidence for necessary attunement on pain of a category error, and that a precedent for McDowell’s misunderstanding is Hegel’s argument for necessary attunement in a (...) system of knowing, whose refutation Schelling holds it is the “merit of skepticism” to provide. (shrink)

Despite a growing number of models argument for the logical possibility of changing the past there continues to be resistance to and confusion surrounding the possibility of changing the past. In this paper I shall attempt to mitigate the resistance and alleviate at least some of the confusion by distinguishing changing the past from what Richard Hanley calls ‘annulling’ the past and distinguishing both from what I shall call ‘otherwising’ the past.

The growth of managed care was accompanied by concern about the impact that changes in health care organization would have on the doctor-patient relationship. We now are in a “post-managed care era,” where some of these changes in health care delivery have come to pass while others have not. A re-examination of the DPR in this setting suggests some surprising results. Rather than posing a new and unprecedented threat, managed care was simply the most recent of numerous strains on the (...) DPR that have occurred throughout the century. These strains are a constant, inevitable consequence of the varying needs and concerns of patient and physicians as they seek to balance their desires for a certain type of DPR with their simultaneous desire for other aspects of care such as lower costs, greater technological sophistication, and improved outcomes. (shrink)

Changes in healthcare financing increasingly rely upon patient cost-sharing to control escalating healthcare expenditures. These changes raise new challenges for physicians that are different from those that arose either under managed care or traditional indemnity insurance. Historically, there have been two distinct bases for arguing that physicians should not consider costs in their clinical decisions—an “aspirational ethic” that exhorts physicians to treat all patients the same regardless of their ability to pay, and an “agency ethic” that calls on physicians to (...) be trustworthy advisors to their patients. In the setting of greater patient cost-sharing, physicians' aspiration and agency roles increasingly conflict. Satisfactorily navigating the new terrain of consumer-driven healthcare requires physicians to consider these two roles and how they can best be reconciled so as to maximize quality of care while respecting the heterogeneity of patients' financial resources and willingness to pay. (shrink)

‘Facticity’ is a concept that classical phenomenologists like Heidegger use to denote the radically contingent or underivably brute conditions of intelligibility. Yet Fichte coins the term, to which he gives the opposing use of denoting unacceptably brute conditions of intelligibility. For him, radical contingency is a problem to be solved by deriving such conditions from reason. Heidegger rejects Fichte's recoil from facticity with his hermeneutics of facticity, supplanting Fichte's metaphor of our always being in reason's hand with the metaphor of (...) our always having been thrown. How does Heidegger inherit and diametrically repurpose Fichte's neologism? Whence the reversed meaning of ‘facticity’ in post-Kantian thought? The answer is Lask's doctoral thesis, which exerts an acknowledged impact on Heidegger's habilitation thesis. Lask interprets ‘facticity’ as Fichte's term for the individuality problem, that is, the resistance of the material particularity of individuals to explanation by the categories genetically deduced from reason. On his interpretation, ‘facticity’ denotes radical contingency in the guise of haecceity, that is, the brute uniqueness of individuals. Lask credits Fichte with registering the problem of individuality, which highlights the world's irreducibly precategorial character. But how is ‘facticity’ transmitted from Lask to Heidegger, given their opposing interpretations of how Fichte understands its meaning? I argue that (1) Lask misreads Fichte as a proponent of facticity, that is, one whose accommodation of radical contingency deflates the Wissenschaftslehre's systematic ambitions, and (2) Lask's misreading, without deceiving Heidegger regarding the sincerity of Fichte's ambitions, encourages Heidegger's own hermeneutics of facticity. (shrink)

Materialism in the philosophy of mind — materialismPM — is the view that everything mental is material (or, equivalently, physical). Consciousness — pain, emotional feeling, sensory experience, and so on — certainly exists. So materialismPM is the view that consciousness is wholly material. It has, historically, nothing to do with denial of the existence of consciousness. Its heart is precisely the claim that consciousness — consciousness! — is wholly material. [2] ‘Physicalism’, the view introduced by members of the Vienna Circle (...) in the late 1920s, also has nothing to do with denial of the existence of consciousness. [3] Recently the words ‘materialism’ and ‘physicalism’ have come to be treated as synonymous, and as names for a position in the philosophy of mind that does involve denial of the existence of consciousness. They’ve been used to name a position that (i) directly rejects the heart of materialism (materialismPM) and (ii) is certainly false. This is a pity, because they’re good terms for a view that is very likely true. (shrink)

ObjectivesTo determine to which degree industry partners in randomised clinical trials own the data and can constrain publication rights of academic investigators.MethodsCohort study of trial protocols, publication agreements and other documents obtained through Freedom of Information requests, for a sample of 42 trials with industry involvement approved by ethics committees in Denmark. The main outcome measures used were: proportion of trials where data was owned by the industry partner, where the investigators right to publish were constrained and if this was (...) mentioned in informed consent documents, and where the industry partner could review data while the trial was ongoing and stop the trial early.ResultsThe industry partner owned all data in 20 trials (48%) and in 16 trials (38%) it was unclear. Publication constraints were described for 30 trials (71%) and this was not communicated to trial participants in informed consent documents in any of the trials. In eight trials (19%) the industry partner could review data during the trial, for 20 trials (48%) it was unclear. The industry partner could stop the trial early without any specific reason in 23 trials (55%).ConclusionsPublication constraints are common, and data is often owned by industry partners. This is rarely communicated to trial participants. Such constraints might contribute to problems with selective outcome reporting. Patients should be fully informed about these aspects of trial conduct. (shrink)

Contemporary religious studies contains many studies of Orthodox theology of the twentieth century, but there are almost no studies of the most prominent modern trend in Orthodox theology, neo-patristics. In particular, in the works of L. Voronkova, G. Gabinsky, M. Gordienko, Y. Kalinin, P. Kurochkin, I. Mozgovy, V. Molokov, M. Novikov, N. Petelinskaya, V. Chertikhin, A. Chertkov, a thorough analysis of tendencies was carried out Modernism of Orthodox theology of the Russian Church. Of these, only M. Novikov briefly criticizes the (...) views of V. Lossky, a representative of Neopatristics, but the researcher does not realize the originality of this trend in Orthodox theology. Especially the tendencies of the development of Orthodox theology of spiritual academic schools of the XIX-beg. XX century. M. Ivanov, M. Glubokovsky, I. Kondratieva, G. Pankov, O. Pechurina, O. Sarapin, L. Fokina were thoroughly researched, but these studies were usually conducted outside the context of all Orthodox theology of the XX century. (shrink)

Λαϊκισμός εναντίον Αντι-Λαϊκισμού: Μια διαχρονική διαμάχη, Νόημα, 21 (2024): 45-55.

In his Philosophical Theology James Ross claims to have uncovered an assumption essential to the proof of God's existence advanced by Duns Scotus: the equivalence of logical and real possibility. Ross argues that the omission is reparable, and that Scotus's proof is ultimately satisfactory. In this paper I examine his claim and determine that while Scotus may have believed there to be a significant connection between these two concepts, his proof of God does not depend on it. Ross's attempt to (...) rework the Scotist demonstration merits consideration on its own terms, however. In calling attention to the relation between real and metaphysical possibility, Ross has hit on a way of circumventing one of the major impediments to the acceptability of Scotus's original proof: the infinite regress of causes. Since Scotus argues against the possibility of the infinite regress in copious detail, we must wonder whether he could have countenanced the alternate route suggested by Ross. While I shall argue that indeed Ross's gambit is flawed in a way that Scotus may have foreseen, his proof nevertheless deserves recognition as an original and noteworthy contribution to the literature. (shrink)

This paper contains an axiomatic theory of first order modal logic with operations, identity, and descriptions together with a formal semantics which interprets the theory in such a manner that empty universes of discourse and denotationless terms are allowed for at each possible world. The intuitive basis of the theory is discussed in preliminary sections, the syntax and semantics of theory are then characterized, its semantical adequacy is demonstrated, and certain important axioms and theorems are discussed in detail in later (...) sections. (shrink)

πγχυ δ' εμαρες σνετον πóησαι | πντι τοτο, sang Sappho ; but, to judge from the controversies which have marked the scholarly discussion of her poem in the sixty-five years since its first publication, her confidence was at least premature. Some problems can indeed be considered to have been settled, either through new finds or through gradual consensus: thus the man of line 7 is Menelaus, not Paris, and few today would see in the poem merely an affirmation of exclusively (...) feminine as opposed to masculine values. But to the twin questions of the function first of the story of Helen in the poem, and especially second of the words with which Helen is introduced — γρ πóλυ περσκθοισα | κλλος νθρώπων 'Eλνα — no satisfactory answer has yet been found. The strictures of Fränkel and of Page on this passage are well known; yet even where their judgements have not been simply taken over, the explanations that have been offered for these two distinct but closely connected problems fail to convince. (shrink)